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The emergence of innovation ecosystems: 
Exploring the role of the keystone firm 
 
Abstract  
 
 
 
During periods of technological change, firms seek new collaborations and sometimes even 
reach out to competitors in order to obtain new resources and competences. Understanding the 
collaborations surrounding new technologies has implications for firms pursuing opportunities 
with new technologies. The notion of ecosystems is increasingly used in literature to address 
value creation activities involving a network of firms. The purpose of this licentiate thesis is to 
understand the emergence of new innovation ecosystems. Previous research on ecosystems 
recognizes “keystone” firm as the anchor that ensure growth and stability in the ecosystem. 
However, the activities that foreshadow the development of an ecosystem and the role played 
by a prospective keystone firm in the emergence of an ecosystem is undertheorized. 
 
Based on a longitudinal case study of a technology development program at an automotive firm, 
the findings presented in this licentiate thesis show how the joint venture established by the 
incumbent firm led to the development of a modular technology. The main findings illustrate 
how the incumbent automotive firm attracted a network of actors that develop innovative 
solutions and other complementarities for the technology. The network of actors developing 
offerings for the modular technology, in turn, facilitated the incumbent firm to position itself 
as a keystone firm and orchestrate the emergence of a new innovation ecosystem. The thesis 
contributes to theory by showing how a firm can orchestrate the emergence of an innovation 
ecosystem and position itself as the keystone firm.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. SETTING THE SCENE 
Over the past decade, technology has advanced at a rapid pace resulting in automation and 
digitalization of industries. This dynamic environment, characterized by fast changes in 
technology, has created a need to revisit established theories on value creation and explore how 
firms in today’s digital economy establish competitive advantage during times of technological 
change. The most habitual question in strategy and management literature has been about how 
firms compete when new technologies emerge? Some technologies immediately substitute the 
existing technology while others may take decades to become mainstream. The pace of 
substitution, depending on various factors, differs greatly (Anderson et al., 1990). A number of 
seminal works have shown that new technologies alter the competitive landscape, leading to 
the entry of new firms in an industry (Schumpeter, 1942; Teece et al., 1997). When new 
technologies and competition enter an industry, established firms (incumbents) struggle to 
survive which often lead to waves of creative destruction in the market (Adner et al., 2016; 
Schumpeter, 1942; Tripsas, 1997) (e.g., Kodak disrupted by digital photography; (Vecchiato, 
2017)). Interestingly, during such technology shifts, some incumbents survive and prosper 
whilst others fail (Tripsas, 1997). Amongst the survivors, few are quick to leverage the new 
technology to regain leadership position whist others take years or decades to gain dominance 
in the new technology (e.g., Apple gaining leadership in smartphone and PC industry from the 
verge of bankruptcy). Thus, incumbent firms have both succeeded and failed during times of 
technological change. In literature, technology is often cited to be a major reason for the success 
and failure of firms. Whilst a shift in the technological landscape often leads to shake-outs in an 
industry, the reason for incumbents’ failure is much broader than just the technology per se. The 
lack of foresight, unwillingness to share profits, path dependence etc. have been attributed as 
reasons for the failure of incumbents (e.g., (Anderson et al., 1990; Suárez et al., 1995; Teece et al., 
1997; Tripsas, 1997; Utterback, 1994).  
 
Today, digital technology is altering the basic tenets of value creation as customers increasingly 
seek not just stand-alone products but also services that cater to their preferences. Internet and 
Communication technology (ICT) has broken down the barriers to compete as start-ups 
challenge industry leaders with radical innovation. This is evident at the success of   
multinationals – yesteryear start-ups – such as Amazon, Facebook, Tencent, Uber who 
dominate their respective industries and sometimes even carve out new industries. The 
establishment of new or hybrid industries is a result of the convergence of technologies in 
products and services. For example, combining digital technology and taxi business has resulted 
in ride sharing firms identified as belonging to both technology and transportation industries 
(e.g., Uber, Lyft, Grab, BlaBlaCar etc.). Further, digital technology has broken down the 
traditional industry barriers as products and services are increasingly created by an 
amalgamation of firms from different industries working together. Such inter-firm 
collaborations transgressing industry boundary(ies) and traditional value chain hierarchies are 
often addressed as ecosystems (Gawer et al., 2002; Linden et al., 2009). This is partly due to 
the non-hierarchical nature of value creation activities, organic development of mutually 
beneficial partnerships akin to biological ecosystems, and the interactions between firms with 
completely unrelated business areas (e.g., Amazon acquiring grocery store chain Whole Foods; 
Apple launching credit card service in partnership with Goldman Sachs. In line with this trend, 
Adner et al. (2016, p.626) argue that understanding technology transitions and the pace of 
substitution necessitates the “examination of interdependencies in the broader ecosystem of 
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components and complements in which the focal technologies are embedded”. However, 
investigations on such ecosystems has not addressed the question on how ecosystems emerge, 
partly due the ex-post definition of the term ecosystem (Gawer et al., 2014; Jacobides et al., 
2018). 
 
1.2. PROBLEM AREA 
In a constantly changing environment characterized by rapid advances in technology, firms 
actively seek new resources and competences to create value. Organizational studies discuss 
how firms create value by using new technologies, new materials and methods to deliver new 
products and services (Clarysse et al., 2014). Value chain thinking suggests an ordered 
sequence of activities and has been useful to understand the functioning of traditional industries 
churning out physical products (Allee, 2000). It has also been useful in explaining the linkage 
of activities within an industry (Peppard et al., 2006).  
 
However, the value chain concept is becoming redundant due to the digitalization of products 
and services (Peppard et al., 2006). Instead, the notion of “value networks” is gaining 
importance as it presents multidimensional linkages between actors who combine their skills 
and assets to create value (Adner et al., 2010; Clarysse et al., 2014; Galunic et al., 2001). 
Previous literature on organizational capability has mainly focused on the internal organization 
perspective, but less on how firms can manage and organize their innovation processes by 
collaborating with other actors in a network. The article by Moore (1993) on “business 
ecosystems” was the starting point for a number of articles using the analogy of biological 
ecosystem to conceptualize value capture in a network. In this context, it is especially 
interesting to examine how (and when) ecosystems emerge during a period of technology 
transition in an industry.  
 
During periods of technological change, firms seek new collaborations and sometimes even 
reach out to competitors in order to obtain new resources and competences (Furr et al., 2018). 
Also, the existence of interdependencies between innovations has been well documented in 
literature (Adner et al., 2016). Further, literature on ecosystem recognizes “keystone” firm as 
the anchor that ensure growth and stability in the ecosystem. However, the activities that 
foreshadow the development of an ecosystem and the role played by the prospective keystone 
firm in the emergence of an ecosystem is undertheorized in literature (Jacobides et al., 2018).  
1.3. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to contribute to literature on ecosystems, this research looks into the automotive 
industry wherein a technology transition (i.e., Autonomous Drive) has drastically altered the 
competitive advantage. The purpose of this licentiate thesis is to understand how an 
incumbent firm orchestrates the emergence of an ecosystem and positions itself as a 
keystone firm. The findings presented in this thesis are a result of a longitudinal case study of 
an Autonomous Drive (AD) technology development program at Volvo Car Group (Henceforth 
addressed as Volvo). Additionally, the study elucidates the implications of such collaborative 
endeavors from the perspective of an incumbent firm. By illustrating the collaborations set up 
by the incumbent firm (Volvo), the thesis shows the transition in Volvo’s role from being an 
OEM in a traditional value chain to a keystone firm in an emerging innovation ecosystem.  
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The thesis will address the following research questions:  
 
RQ1: How does a new ecosystem emerge?  
 
RQ2: How does a keystone firm orchestrate collaborations in an emerging ecosystem ? 
 
2. EMPIRICAL CONTEXT  
The aim of the licentiate study is to better understand the impact of new technology on 
traditional industries. For this, the automotive industry was selected as appropriate to 
understand the impact of a new technology. The area of autonomous driving in particular, was 
identified as an appropriate empirical context to investigate the aforementioned research 
questions.  In this chapter the developments of the industry will be summarized. 
2.1. THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
From carts and carriages pulled by animals to vehicles that drive themselves, the mode of 
transportation has seen massive transformations. Cars, in particular, have developed from being 
a luxury to being a basic necessity for most people. Yet, the evolution of the industry prior to 
the digital era is nothing compared to the rapid advancements taking place in the industry today. 
Recent trends in electrification, ride sharing and autonomous drive has drastically altered the 
competitive landscape of the industry (Lee et al., 2016; Pelliccione et al., 2017; Thomopoulos 
et al., 2015).  
 
Due to the increase in the amount of digital features in modern vehicles, competences and 
resources outside the OEMs’ traditional value chain are critical  (Bimbraw, 2015; Lee et al., 
2016; Mondragon et al., 2007). This entails that cars are becoming complex product systems 
encompassing advanced software along with hardware (Burke et al., 2004; Pelliccione et al., 
2017). The increase in the amount of embedded systems in modern vehicles coupled with 
advancement in internet and communication technology (ICT) has drastically shifted the 
innovation landscape (Mondragon et al., 2007; Pretschner et al., 2007; Townsend et al., 2014). 
The automotive industry is now approaching the next major transformation: autonomous 
driving – propelled by an integrated interplay of both market and technology factors (Pinch et 
al., 1987).  
2.2. AUTONOMOUS DRIVE: WHAT IS IT? 
The autonomous car (also known as a driverless car, a robotic car or a self-driving car) is a 
technological system that needs to sense the environment, detect the position of vehicle of the 
road, and make decisions on how to manoever the vehicle in a given situation 
(www.bosch.com). These vehicles rely on software to bridge the gap between sensor physics 
and the mechanical actuation of the vehicles (e.g., steering and brakes). The vehicle operates 
by using data from different sensors like radars, cameras and lidars which is then processed by 
algorithms to precisely compute the position, orientation etc. An autonomous car is thus a 
complex technological system combining multiple sub-systems that handle perception, decision 
making, and operation of the vehicle.  
 
In the industry and in media, driverless technology is commonly addressed by many different 
terms, such as autonomous driving system, self-driving car technology, autonomous car 
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technology, autonomous vehicles, etc. For consistency and clarity, this thesis will address this 
technological system as Autonomous Drive (AD) technology. Autonomous vehicles have the 
potential to transform the entire automotive industry and alter much of today’s transport 
infrastructure (Greenblatt et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2016). Still, standardization and established 
domain design provide a hurdle for the adoption of AD technology (Abernathy et al., 1978; 
Anderson et al., 1990). New technologies need a standard or dominant design that allows for 
widespread adoption (Brem et al., 2016). The AD technology is increasingly developed outside 
the OEM’s value chain and the established firms need to interact with actors outside the industry 
to access necessary resources and competences.  
 
To summarize, the setting of the development of the AD technology in the automotive industry 
is considered a suitable case to study emerging innovation ecosystems. It remains to be seen 
how these developments will evolve and if the incumbent automotive firms will retain their 
current dominance in the industry.  
2.3. VOLVO’S AD PROGRAM  
Volvo Car Group is a Swedish car manufacturer that is considered one of the market leaders in 
the area of safety (Liu et al., 2004). In recent years, Volvo has expressed interest in developing 
AD and has invested hugely in its AD program1 (VolvoCars, 2019). Volvo’s strong safety and 
Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) record makes development of AD technology a 
natural step for the firm. Due to the inherent complexity in developing autonomous cars, Volvo  
established several collaborations in the area of AD and the partners include many non-
automotive firms.  The main purpose of the AD program is to develop AD technology alongside 
the software and hardware systems required to produce a fully autonomous car.  Volvo’s AD 
program is based on three main sub-projects: the Drive Me project (a research initiative); 
Zenuity (a JV with Veoneer,) and the Uber project (redundant car platform). Drive Me involves 
several research platforms with various partner organizations (Victor et al., 2017).  
 
The software development is handled by Zenuity, a new entrant in the industry created as a 
joint venture between Volvo and Veoneer (previously a part of Autoliv) (VolvoCars, 2017a). 
Zenuity develops ADAS and AD software solutions for Volvo’s AD program. Veoneer is a 
major automotive supplier with expertise in the area of automotive safety and production of 
seatbelts, airbags, collision avoidance systems, etc. Both Volvo and Veoneer have transferred 
their intellectual property on ‘Advanced Driver Assistance Systems’ (ADAS), know-how and 
personnel to the joint venture firm ‘Zenuity’ (VolvoCars, 2017a). Despite the shared ownership 
and assets, Zenuity is an independent firm and positions itself as an AD and ADAS software 
supplier (Zenuity, 2018). The AD and ADAS software solutions were developed in close 
collaboration with Volvo and are commercialized through Veoneer.  
 
Volvo set up a collaboration with Uber, a global leader in the ridesharing  business to develop 
base vehicles with latest technologies necessary for a fully autonomous cars (VolvoCars, 2016, 
2017b). According to the CEO of Volvo, the Uber partnership is in line with Volvo‘s intention 
to be a supplier of AD ride-sharing services globally (VolvoCars, 2017b). The CEO believes 
                                                        
1 AD program began as an internal project at Volvo. Later, it was reorganized into a program 
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that the alliance with Uber positions Volvo at the heart of the technological revolution taking 
place in the automotive industry (VolvoCars, 2016). 
 
Apart from Volvo and Zenuity, several other actors such as Chalmers University, Autoliv, City 
of Gothenburg, Lindholmen Science Park etc. are involved in the Drive Me project. Thus, much 
of the innovation activity in developing autonomous drive technology is taking place outside 
of Volvo in a collaborative set up. The thesis is based upon research carried out at Volvo Car 
group. Findings pertaining to the AD program and references to Zenuity, Uber and other actors 
are based upon insights gained from the research carried out at Volvo’s autonomous drive 
program. 
 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
This section contains a review of literature on innovation and ecosystem. The first part provides 
a general overview on technology and innovation in order to position the research context (i.e., 
technology transition in mature industries). This is followed by details regarding previous 
research on value networks and ecosystems where the thesis makes contributions. 
3.1. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND INNOVATION  
Innovation shapes the industries and determines the future of firms (J. M. Utterback, 1994) and 
is the most sought-after activity by firms in order to sustain their competitive advantage and 
technology is a key factor in innovation success. The knowledge economy and rapid 
advancements in technology has reiterated the urgency and need for innovation as it is central 
to firm competitiveness (Lawson et al., 2001). Yet, very few large firms have been successful 
in carrying out innovation that are disruptive or radical in nature. Non-incremental innovation, 
the one that is considered to be quintessential for long term survival has been a conundrum for 
large firms as startups over the past decade have been successful at challenging large 
established firms in ways that have been never seen before (Latzer, 2009).  
 
In today’s competitive environment, leaders and managers are driving to build organizational 
capabilities to engage in innovative endeavors (Teece et al., 1994). Large firms possess the 
resources and capabilities that are one of the greatest constraints for startups and small firms 
but there seems to be little evidence of positive relationship between R&D intensity and 
successful innovation (Klepper, 2002; Lee et al., 2001; Tripsas, 1997). Interestingly, large 
firms’ existing customer base makes them reluctant to undertake radical innovation that can 
cannibalize on existing customer bases and revenues (Govindarajan et al., 2005; Tripsas, 1997). 
However, in today’s digital world, the need to innovate – not just occasional or incremental – 
but systematic, continuous and radical innovation with a solid success rate is quintessential for 
survival (Lawson & Samson, 2001). Technological change underpins the innovation trajectory 
and serves as both creative and destructive force in the survival of firms (Utterback, 2004).  
 
Explaining the dynamics of technological change is an important aspect of technology strategy 
literature (Adner et al., 2016). The technology S-curve is an undisputed representation of both 
technology life cycle and competition between technologies (Adner et al., 2016; Christensen et 
al., 1995; Utterback, 1994). Contrary to previous knowledge that new technology becomes 
mainstream when it posits superior performance, Christensen et al. (1995) illustrated that 
technology transition can take place even when the performance of the new technology is 
inferior to the old. He argued that if established firms over-served on the main performance 
dimension, users who expect performance on other dimensions may embrace a new technology 
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even if it is inferior (to existing technology) along the main performance dimension. 
Interestingly, (Adner et al., 2016) points out that literature on technology strategy focus on the 
supply side (i.e., firms developing the technology) and diffusion of innovation literature on the 
demand side (i.e., user adopting a technology). A deeper understanding of technological change 
however demands a holistic understanding that links technology evolution and technology 
adoption. Technology is often packaged in a system or a product and consumers assess the 
performance of the entire system rather than independent technologies (Adner et al., 2016). 
Thus, in order to create value, firms must focus not just on the performance of the focal 
technology but on the entire system. Adner et al. (2010) opine that firms strive to be first movers 
with new technologies in order to establish a competitive advantage. However, to be technology 
leaders and introduce new innovation, a firm needs support from other actors to develop 
interdependent innovations Adner et al. (2010).  
3.2. THE DOMINANT DESIGN BATTLE 
Along with technology, markets play an equally important role, one good example is the 
QWERTY keyboard2 standard which is indomitable due to its high market penetrations (David, 
1985). The invasion of new technologies follows a predictable trajectory, through a process of 
variation, selection and retention(Nelson et al., 2005; Pinch et al., 1987). Initially, an 
established technology usually offers better performance (or lower cost or both) than an 
invading technology. However, if the invading technology has any merit, it rapidly develops 
and attains better performance than the established technology which by now has entered a 
stage of slow, incremental improvements (Christensen et al., 1995; Utterback, 1994). 
Nevertheless, new technologies do not always obscure old technology and in certain cases, both 
technologies become stronger thereby rendering a symbiotic relationship (J. Utterback, 2004). 
For example, ‘shaving blades and electric razors’ or ‘DVDs and movies in theatres’, both 
remain successful and also complement each other (Utterback, 2004).  
 
Technological discontinuity initiates an era of ferment leading to intense competition amongst 
the variations leading to the selection of a dominant configuration (Anderson et al., 1990). 
During this phase, a dominant design is not yet established and marks the beginning of a new 
innovation S-curve. After intense competition, a dominant design is established by the early 
majority in order to overcome technical obstacles and facilitate commercialization. The 
established dominant design then becomes the standard architecture over which incremental 
improvements are made until another discontinuous technology leads to a new cycle of 
variation, selection and retention. The emergence of a dominant design paradigm signals the 
acceptance of agreed upon standards and these remain intact until overturned by a new design 
(Teece, 1986). For example, the wireless inductive charging technology for mobile devices had 
two technical designs, ‘PMA’ by Powermat Technologies and ‘Qi’ by Wireless Power 
Consortium (WPC). When the two leading mobile handset manufactures Apple and Samsung 
adopted Qi technology, it became the dominant design for inductive charging in the industry. 
Eventually, Powermat abandoned ‘PMA’ and joined together with WPC to promote the ‘Qi’ 
technology as the industry standard for wireless inductive charging. New technology thus 
initiates a period of intense competition and collaboration between firms in order to establish a 
dominant design. During this period, firms seek new ways to create value using the new 
technology.  
 
                                                        
2  The survival of QWERTY keyboard is largely due to the “presence of strong technical interrelatedness, scale 
economics and irreversibilities due to learning and habituation” (David, 1985, p. 336). 
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3.3. VALUE CREATION IN NETWORKS 
In a knowledge economy, the most pertinent question is perhaps to ask, how is value created? 
Normann et al. (1993) describe strategy as the art of creating value. Strategic activities involve 
the way in which a company links together its resources and competences to create value for 
its customers. Value chain thinking has been the most useful way to understand the value 
creation activities in traditional industries churning out physical products (Allee, 2000). The 
concept of value chain is useful to understand the linkage of activities within an industry 
(Peppard et al., 2006). According to traditional models of industrial economy, every firm 
positions itself in a value chain with supplier providing inputs to firms downstream who then 
combine these inputs and pass it to next actors in the chain, either businesses or end customers 
(Normann et al., 1993). In today’s digital economy, however, the concept of value chain is 
becoming redundant due to the digitalization of products and services (Peppard & Rylander, 
2006). The value chain approach presents little distinction between the actors in terms of their 
relationship with the focal firm (Adner et al., 2010a). The importance of an actor with high 
bargaining power over a focal firm’s ability to capture value do not change based on its position 
as a complementor, buyer or supplier. With advancements in internet and communication 
technologies (ICT), the physical dimension of the value chain is losing its relevance in modern 
industries. Thus, the traditional methods of analyzing competitive advantage (Porter, 1980), 
need to be revisited due to the emergence of the network economy.  
 
In today’s digital age, the creation of a superior product spreads beyond the boundaries of the 
lead firm (Linden et al., 2009). The value chain approach suggests ordered sequence of 
activities whereas a network presents multidimensional linkages (Adner et al., 2010; 
Peltoniemi, 2004). In a value network, value is created by a group of firms combining their 
skills and assets leading to the recombination of capabilities in the network (Clarysse et al., 
2014; Galunic et al., 2001). The notion of networks is central to innovation and dates back to 
Schumpeter who argued that innovation arises from new combinations of ideas (Dodgson et 
al., 2013). An innovative idea starts out as a set of connections between neurons within the 
brain (Dodgson et al., 2013) and a network of interconnected ideas manifesting into an 
innovation. Networks of people, firms, clusters and regions have been used as an analogy to 
advance the understanding of innovation. According to (Dodgson et al., 2013) , “A network is 
any system that can be described by a set of things or actors, and the connections between 
them”.  
 
A value network extends beyond just transactions around goods, services, and revenue. The 
strength of the value network exists in the interactions between the actors (Aarikka-Stenroos et 
al., 2017; Allee, 2000; Peppard et al., 2006; Verna, 2008). It enables exchange of tacit and 
explicit knowledge, technical know-how, policy development, process and product knowledge 
etc. In a value network, a clear understanding of the expectations by each network member is 
crucial (Peppard et al., 2006). According to Allee (2000), “A value network generates economic 
value through complex dynamic exchanges between one or more enterprises, its customers, 
suppliers, strategic partners, and the community”. The participants of a value network can be 
identified from the standpoint of the focal firm, wherein all actors who influence the value 
delivered by the focal firm to the end customer are active members of the value network. 
Networks can have a multitude of meanings and definition. Value network is perhaps a way to 
envisage how value is created by multiple firms working together.  
 
During turbulent market environment, firms seek new ways of collaborations with unlikely 
partners in order to sustain their competitive advantage (Furr et al., 2018). Firms refrain from 
developing new products and services alone when there is uncertainty in the market due to new 
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technologies (Furr et al., 2018). They instead try to engage with many partners in order to share 
resources and competences. This set up where multiple firms or actors collaborate together to 
develop value is often referred to as an ecosystem. Further, (Clarysse et al., 2014) describe that 
the ecosystem construct is embedded in the idea of value networks.  
3.4. THE ECOSYSTEM CONSTRUCT 
The ecosystem approach was originally adapted from biology to the business context by 
(Moore, 1993) to illustrate a business ecosystem as network of actors characterized by  
interdependence and co-evolution. Two decades later, the use of the term in the field of 
management has proliferated (Scaringella et al., 2018). An ecosystem consists of network of 
individual firms contributing their individual solutions to a common platform (or value 
proposition) in order to offer a complex value proposition (Adner et al., 2010; Clarysse et al., 
2014). To create value to end customer, an ecosystem integrates complementary solutions 
developed by interconnected, yet independent actors (Dattée et al., 2018). Today, the term 
‘ecosystem’ has gained attention in research fields such as strategic management (Adner, 2017; 
Adner et al., 2010; Jacobides et al., 2018; Teece, 2007; Zhang et al., 2007) and innovation 
management (Clarysse et al., 2014; Gawer et al., 2014). The concept of “ecosystem” has 
flourished in management and marketing literature (Aarikka-Stenroos et al., 2017) with new 
conceptualizations such as “innovation ecosystem” (Adner et al., 2010), “platform ecosystem” 
(Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; Gawer et al., 2014), “knowledge ecosystem” , and “entrepreneurial 
ecosystem” 
 
Increasingly, management literature is also addressing value creation in the context of 
ecosystems (Adner et al., 2016; Clarysse et al., 2014; Dattée et al., 2018; Jacobides et al., 2018), 
thereby shifting away from the context of bilateral partnerships (Dodgson et al., 2013; Madhok 
et al., 1998; Teece, 1986). The strategy literature has predominantly focused on value capture 
and the firm’s ability to establish competitive advantage by deploying its resources and 
competences and maintaining high bargaining power (Danneels, 2002; Teece et al., 1997). This 
literature addresses the various roles played by firms in the value chain paying attention to the 
distinctions between focal firm, supplier, complementors, buyers etc. (Adner et al., 2010). 
However, the bargaining power of a partner (a complementor, buyer or supplier) over the focal 
firm’s ability to capture value is not analyzed as having an impact. The value capture potential 
of each actor, be it a supplier, buyer or complementor, is an important aspect of an ecosystem.  
 
The ecosystem mode of operation replaces the ill-effects of vertical integration, hierarchy and 
direct control (Williamson et al., 2012). According to Adner et al. (2010), although value chain 
suggests interlinks between various firms, the literature does not address the location of 
activities in a value chain and the difference between complements and components. In order 
to address the distinction between a component (e.g., software for hardware product; GPU in a 
computer) and a complement (e.g., mouse for computers; charging infrastructure for electric 
vehicles) and its role in enhancing the focal firm’s innovation, the construct of an ecosystem 
has gained prominence in both academia and practice alike (Adner et al., 2010). Industries such 
as biotech are typically organized as value chains where there is a clear division of labour 
between the different actors in the value chain (Clarysse et al., 2014). However, ecosystems do 
not adhere to a linear value creation process. In an ecosystem, firms deliver value to end 
customers in a non-linear value creation process. Thus, an ecosystem can be broadly defined as 
network of firms with horizontal interdependencies (Clarysse et al., 2014; Moore, 1993). In 
such inter-organizational networks, firms engage in both collaborative and competitive 
practices resulting a coopetition structure (Moore, 1993).  
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3.5. KEYSTONE FIRMS IN ECOSYSTEMS  
In order to gain competitive advantage, ecosystem members need to exchange resources such 
as knowledge and the members should also be aware of their position, where value is created 
and how the relationships are established (Williamson et al., 2012). By referring to dynamics 
between actors in a value network, business ecosystem theory Moore (1993) offers a new 
approach to collaborative relationships. Ecosystems, as the name epitomizes can “evolve 
through serendipity and self-organization” (Williamson et al., 2012). A firm’s resources and 
capabilities determine its role in the ecosystem and their relationship with other actors (Iansiti 
et al., 2004). Not all actors occupy the same role or perform the same set of activities (Wulf et 
al., 2017). The development of an ecosystem is often attributed to a lead firm (or hub firm) that 
orchestrates various activities in the ecosystem. Iansiti et al. (2004) identify keystone, 
Dominators, Niche players and Hub landlords as the various roles that may be seen in an 
ecosystem. The keystone firms are considered to be the caretakers of the ecosystem who ensure 
the overall health of the ecosystem. Niche players on the other hand are seen on the peripheries 
of the ecosystem and channel important ideas and innovations into the ecosystem. Dominators 
or Landlords in turn are actors who seek to capture value, especially in a business ecosystem.  
 
Iansiti et al. (2004) attribute two important roles of a keystone firm, namely “creating value” 
and “sharing value” with participants. They further state that, “Keystones can create value for 
their ecosystems in numerous ways, but the first requirement usually involves the creation of a 
platform, an asset in the form of services, tools, or technologies that offers solutions to others 
in the ecosystem[…]Keystone firms leave the vast majority of value creation to others in the 
ecosystem, but what they do create is crucial to the community’s survival” (Iansiti et al., 2004, 
p. 13). The keystone firm plays an active role in organizing activities and ensuring the overall 
health of the ecosystem (Williamson et al., 2012). By promoting and enhancing the 
development of an ecosystem, this firm can shape the structure and functioning of the 
ecosystem.  
 
Importantly, Iansiti et al., (2004) acknowledge four important ways by which the keystone firm 
can advance the development of an ecosystem, namely: 
• Establish links between participants and simplify interactions to improve productivity 
• Ensure third parties are able to develop products efficiently 
• Enhance robustness by incorporating technological innovations that provide support for 
participants in reacting to new and uncertain conditions 
• Encourage niche creation by providing the technologies to all third-party organizations 
Thus, the health of the entire ecosystem depends on the keystone firm and removal of it may 
lead to the catastrophic collapse of the entire network. 
 
The knowledge sharing activities of a keystone firm depends on the nature of the value creation 
network. Closely or densely embedded networks consists of intense exchange of resources in 
the form of knowledge etc. whereas a more open network is not easily influenced (Ahuja, 2000) 
and the keystone has less significance in such networks. Furr et al.,(2018) identify subtle 
changes in the role of the keystone firm depending on the nature of the ecosystem, if it is a 
centralized or an adaptive ecosystem. In a centralized ecosystem, a keystone firm (addressed as 
a broker) “connects to partners but keeps them separate, forcing them to work through itself”. 
On the other hand, in an adaptive ecosystem, a keystone (addressed as orchestrator) “connects 
multiple partners and encourages them to work directly with one another” (Furr et al., 2018, 
p.61). Explicit knowledge is easy to share between the keystone firm and its partners whereas 
tacit knowledge is embedded within a firm and its cumbersome for external actors to access or 
relate to its context (Adner et al., 2010; Iansiti et al., 2004; Williamson et al., 2012).  
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The nature of formal and informal inter-organization relationship in an ecosystem also 
influences how the participants access and share knowledge (Wulf et al., 2017). This also 
influences the trust and willingness to cooperate with each other. In this regard, the role of a 
keystone firm is crucial for the flow of knowledge throughout the ecosystem. Keystone firms 
can control and orchestrate the ecosystem by developing rules of engagement (Zahra and 
Nambisan, 2012) and maintain the flexibility of the ecosystem in adjusting to external threats 
and identifying new opportunities (Iansiti et al., 2004).  
 
4. METHOD   
This chapter describes the methodological choices that have been used to address the research 
questions presented in chapter one.  
4.1. RESEARCH APPROACH  
A complex phenomenon, such as emergence of an ecosystem, wherein developments occur 
over time necessitates a long term perspective. This motivates a longitudinal study as it 
facilitates a deeper understanding of a specific context, i.e., how various agents (individuals) 
and units (teams) interact, and the underlying reasons for such interactions. Literature on 
ecosystem also highlight the need for longitudinal studies in order to understand the emergence 
of new ecosystem (e.g., (Gawer et al., 2014; Jacobides et al., 2018). Thus, the study tracked 
activities taking place within the AD technology development project at Volvo.  The unique 
empirical context and the need to understand underlying reasons, motivations and opinions of 
individuals at the case firm warrants a  qualitative study with longitudinal approach (Flick, 
2014). In a qualitative study, the emphasis is usually on a “specific case, a focused and bounded 
phenomenon embedded in its context” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 10). A longitudinal study 
facilitates a deeper understanding of a specific context, i.e., how various agents (individuals) 
and units (teams) interact, and the underlying reasons for such interactions. Further, in order to 
contribute to theories on organizational adaptation, innovation and change, it has been argued 
that it is necessary to “explore the contexts, content and process of change together with 
interconnections through time” (Van de Ven et al., 1990, p. 215).   
4.2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A single case study design was deemed suitable as it allows for in-depth investigation of a 
phenomenon (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Yin (2009) has suggested that a case study design 
is suitable when the focus of the study is to understand “how” and “why” questions and to 
investigate events that are difficult to control or manipulate. Although case studies do not have 
a universally accepted definition (Dubois et al., 1999), this research uses Yin’s (1994, p. 18) 
definition: “a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident”. Due to the emergent and unique nature of the phenomenon, 
the research tended to be iterative (Dubois et al., 2002; Siggelkow, 2007). The empirical data 
and theory were revisited concurrently to better understand the context. By moving back and 
forth between the empirical setting and theory, the research design is in line with the systematic 
combining approach (Dubois et al., 2002). This meant that new questions emerged during the 
full course of the study.  
 
Due to the interpretative nature of my research, I label it as “constructivist inquiry” (Lincoln, 
1985; 2007). According to Guba et al. (1982), “positivist inquiry (quantitative) assumes a single 
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reality and inquiry findings are based on a single reality”. Whilst a constructivist considers 
multiple realities as an alternative explanation for social reality. Constructivist inquiry deals 
with research that is interpretative, and non‐experimental in nature (i.e., non‐positivist). This 
leads to abductive reasoning of the findings based on sense-making and perceptions of case 
(Gioia et al., 2013). Data was collected ethnographically through observations, interviews and 
secondary sources. This type of data collection wherein the researcher is immersed in the case 
setting, as  a ‘participant as observer’ can be described as an ethnographic method (Anderson, 
2009; Yin, 2009).   
4.3. DATA COLLECTION  
As part of the ethnographic method, I participated in team discussions and weekly meetings 
which allowed for collecting observational data in the form of field notes. Unlike other data 
collection techniques where researchers tend to ask specific questions, ethnography involves 
visiting the subject’s location (field) in order to observe and listen in a non-intrusive manner. 
On the other hand, participant observation is a way to be in direct spatial relationship with the 
study object and enables the researcher to ascertain if what the interviewees say they do and 
what they actually do in reality tally (Mulhall, 2003). 
 
To address the technique used to collect the field notes, I will use the term ‘participant 
observation’ to emphasize the fact that observations, along with interviews, were used to collect 
data whereas ethnography is my overarching research method. According to Atkinson et al., 
(1998, p. 249), “Both ethnography and participant observations have been claimed to represent 
a uniquely humanistic, interpretive approach, as opposed to supposedly ‘scientific’ and 
‘positivist’ positions”. Distinguishing between ‘ethnography’ and ‘participant observation’ has 
been problematic and controversial, as scholars have used them interchangeably (Aktinson et 
al., 1998). It has been argued that all forms of social research are a form of participant 
observation, because a researcher cannot study social contexts without being part of it 
(Atkinson et al., 1998).  
 
Table 1. Overview of data from the longitudinal study use in the appended papers 
 
Observational data, in general, is useful to identify nonverbal expressions, who interacts with 
whom, how actors communicate with each other, and catalogue events as they unfold 
(Kawulich, 2005). Thus, the field notes are an important tool to document observations and it 
helped to ensure that there is little distinction between what has been observed and what has 
been interpreted by the observer (Flick, 2014). Along with observations, interviews were 
carried out and allowed for gathering additional information or check the accuracy of 
observations and gain new accounts of a problem based on personal experience  (Easterby-
Paper Type of data  Study context Data 
collection  
1 Field notes,  interviews, 
and secondary data 
The industry transformation 2016-2017 
2 Field notes, and 
secondary data 
The shift in way of working at the 
keystone firm 
2018 
3 Field notes,  interviews, 
and secondary data 
The importance of tactical activities in 
a new technology development project 
2018-2019 
4 Field notes,  interviews, 
and secondary data 
The emergence of a new innovation 
ecosystem  
2016-2019 
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Smith et al., 2012; Maxwell, 2012). The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner 
as it allowed room to discuss interviewee’s experiences and interpretations on various subjects 
(Flick, 2014). Both observations and interviews are useful to gain insights about non-
contemporary events that took place in the past or ones that cannot be observed (Maxwell, 
2012). Interviews were documented through recordings and later transcribed. A total of 26 
semi-structured interviews were carried out. Along with interviews, field notes amounting to 
700 pages was collected. Additionally, secondary data in the form of press releases, archives, 
etc., were used to supplement the observations and interviews. The papers appended in the 
thesis were written at different periods and focused on various contexts (See figure 1). The use 
of data in the appended papers is further illustrated in Table 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between research questions, type of data and the appended papers 
4.4. DATA ANALYSIS  
The exploratory and longitudinal approach renders the research process to be iterative where 
data is collected and analysed in parallel. One of the issues that I faced during the initial phase 
of my study was that data piled up very quickly due to the frequency of field visits. Over time 
the sheer volume of data required a structured data analysis process (See table 2). Gioia et al. 
(2013) acknowledged this issue by expressing that it is quite normal to feel “lost” in the data 
analysis process. The rich data gathered would provide little value if not processed in a 
structured manner. Thus, I decided to do the data analysis concurrently with the data collection 
(Dubois et al., 2002; Maxwell, 2012).  
 
The interviews were transcribed and analysed using the data analysis software NVivo. The field 
notes were coded using the Xmind mapping tool during the first year of the study and later 
using NVivo. To categorize and identify patterns in the data, codes (shown as ‘nodes’ in the 
software) were generated on NVivo (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). The data was coded into 
non-hierarchical user-defined nodes, and the coding process was guided by theoretical 
framework. A few codes from NVivo are shown in figure 2.  
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Table 2. Data sources and quantity  
Data source Participant(s) Type of data  Quantity  Time 
period 
Stakeholder 
interactions 
Senior managers Semi-structured 
interviews 
26 2016-
2019 
Informal 
discussions 
Senior managers and 
managers 
Photos of White 
board discussions, 
audio notes 
_ 2017-
2019 
Weekly 
meetings 
Engineers, Product 
owners, Senior managers 
Field notes 700 pages  2016-
2019 
PI planning All employees Field notes Occurs every 12 
weeks (Since 
June 2018) 
2018-
2019 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Examples of codes from NVivo 
4.5. RESEARCH QUALITY  
Any research undertaken by a single field-worker invites the question of validity and why the 
study should be accepted (Maxwell, 2012). Validity in general is concerned with the integrity 
of the results derived from the research (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012; Saunders et al., 2009). As 
a qualitative researcher, I intend to understand the phenomenon through relationships between 
different constructs. The validity of my research depend on the extent to which the findings 
provide a true representation of the phenomenon (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). In other words, 
validity delves into the integrity of conclusions generated from a research study (Bryman et al., 
2015). Although, the validity of results in not guaranteed by following a particular method, it 
is pertinent to discuss the relationship of the conclusion to the phenomenon studied (Maxwell, 
2012).  
 
To ensure valid and reliable results, as a researcher with constructivist epistemology, I used 
multiple methods to gather data (Golafshani, 2003). The use of multiple data sources in the 
form of interviews and observations helped access the experiences and perspectives of those in 
my case (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Frequent interactions with the stakeholders at Volvo 
 20 
enhanced the understanding of the program context. Through co-authoring papers with peer 
researchers, I also accommodated the perspectives and ideas of additional researchers. Johnson 
(1997) addresses this as “investigator triangulation”. Thus, triangulation in terms of including 
multiple sources of data and collaborating with peer researchers are two initiatives I took to 
improve the validity of study results (Golafshani, 2003).  
 
It is pertinent to discuss trustworthiness of my research due to my qualitative approach and 
abductive reasoning of my findings. Trustworthiness is especially important in a single case 
design. The case that I investigate is unique and findings from the study are rooted in a real-life 
context offering an understanding of the phenomenon, i.e., the emergence of an ecosystem 
(Siggelkow, 2007). Case study research has sometimes been criticized, as results are difficult 
to generalize beyond the scope of the case (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012; Siggelkow, 2007). By 
clearly describing the research context and inherent assumptions in the study, the study is 
expected to be useful for future investigations involving ecosystems and develop knowledge in 
the field.  
 
5. SUMMARY OF APPENDED PAPERS  
In this section, the four appended papers are summarized. The main contributions of each paper 
are presented, followed by a table indexing each paper to the research questions presented in 
section one. The method is not presented in-depth here as all four papers are based on data 
from the same longitudinal case study, presented in the method chapter. 
5.1. PAPER I  
The transformation of the automotive firm in the age of automation– Early findings 
from a case study of the Drive Me project at Volvo car Group  
 
In recent times, research on inter-firm collaborations address the fact that firms have 
increasingly opened up their innovation processes to collaborate with other actors, ranging from 
suppliers to customers and even competitors. This is due to the rapid advancements in 
technologies that often render knowledge and resources of incumbents obsolete. Automotive 
industry is often attributed as a mature industry with hierarchical value chains built around 
OEMs. Electrification, autonomous mobility and ride hailing services are leading to a huge shift 
in the resource and competence base of the entire industry. The advancements in sensor systems 
and software in modern vehicles has increased the interactions between OEMs and non-
automotive firms. Autonomous Drive (AD) technology is seen as a radical technological shift 
with a potential to transform mobility as we know today.  
 
The purpose of paper I is to understand the challenges that incumbent automotive firms face in 
the transition to autonomous vehicles. The paper is based on a longitudinal case study of 
Volvo’s AD program. Insights from the project3 revealed that the nature of activities in the AD 
program are in stark contrast to traditional projects in the automotive industry. The paper argues 
that the established value chains in the automotive industry is unfit for developing autonomous 
drive (AD) technology. Value chain thinking has been the most useful way to understand the 
functioning of traditional industries churning out physical products (Allee, 2000). The 
empirical observations at Volvo’s AD program show that the value chain way of organizing 
                                                        
3 Paper I & III address the AD program as a project. This is due to the recent transition of Volvo’s “AD 
technology development” from a project to a program 
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activities between OEMs and suppliers is giving way for a value network. The type of 
collaborations and competences needed for the AD program necessitated that Volvo engaged 
itself in a value network where all actors possess significant competences and know-how. 
Further, high levels of complexity with technologies (such as GPUs, Cloud network, Lidar, 
Radar etc.) and uncertainty with legislation, technology standards etc. rendered the traditional 
waterfall way of working unfit.  
 
Paper I makes two important contributions regarding the development of AD tech. Firstly, the 
development of value networks in the automotive industry due to the changing innovation 
landscape. Secondly, the need to shift from traditional waterfall way of working in order to 
handle the software development activities that is becoming a major part of development 
activities in the automotive industry. Paper I highlights the major differences between a 
traditional car development project and an autonomous car project based on new technology 
development.  
5.2. PAPER II 
The blind leading the mute: Formal leaders’ potential to facilitate institutionalization of 
the agile myth 
 
More and more firms are moving from plan-driven to an agile approach to new product 
development. New product development in a firm relies on formally designed plan-driven 
development processes. The formal processes are often complemented by informal structures 
and are considered indispensable to the development of new products. In recent times, many 
firms have embraced agile development methods in order to handle the dynamic environmental 
context (Rigby et al., 2016). The popularity of the agile development approach has significantly 
altered the nature of planning and executing tasks. The purpose of the paper is to illustrate a 
paradox whereby agile development constrains the existing agility embedded in informal 
structures.  
 
Firms deep entrenched in traditional structured development approaches (e.g.: waterfall) that 
promote formalized, sequential development style are increasingly attracted by the promises 
that agile provides. Agile is seen as a way to promote flexibility in the product development 
that is often seen as the weakness with plan-driven processes. However, the shift from 
traditional to agile is not without challenges (Dikert et al., 2016) and is a conundrum for formal 
leaders pioneering the transition.  
 
Whist informal networks and self-organizing employees inspire the formal adoption of agile, 
institutionalizing agile nevertheless leads to the disruption of informal networks and established 
relationships. This paradox is exemplified in the paper by drawing on theory of institutional 
work. The paper is based on a longitudinal case study from an AD technology development 
project that recently shifted from plan-driven to agile development. Using observations from a 
longitudinal study, Paper II exemplifies the role of formal leadership in the institutionalization 
of agile.  
 
This paper maps activities inside the AD program and addresses the internal challenges 
encountered by the keystone firm of an emerging ecosystem. The findings address how formal 
leaders can address the institutionalization of agile and contributes to literature on agile 
development by underlying the conflicts that arise during a transition from plan-driven way of 
working to agile.  
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5.3. PAPER III 
 Role of tactics in R&D projects  
 
This paper builds upon the data collected during the agile transformation at Volvo’s AD 
program. The interest for this paper originated from the frequent use of the word “Tactics” by 
a senior manager (also my stakeholder at Volvo). He felt that the uncertainty and complexity 
in developing an autonomous car necessitated a tactical mindset. This invoked an interest in 
understanding the duality between agile and tactics. Both strategy and tactics are established in 
literature as essential for project success (Ackoff, 1970; Casadesus-Masanell et al., 2010; Moe 
et al., 2012; Schultz et al., 1987). Despite the well-established importance of both tactics and 
strategy for project success (Slevin et al., 1987), few academic works have addressed the use 
of tactics in Agile projects.  
 
The purpose of the paper is to understand how agile methodology supports R&D projects in 
being tactical. It draws on data from the longitudinal case study and insights from the senior 
manager who is also a co-author of the paper (Asselin, 2003). From the data, four observations 
were selected to elucidate the need for tactics in the AD program and the impact of agile way 
of working in executing tactics.  
 
The legal framework uncertainty: The regulatory uncertainty surrounding autonomous vehicles 
necessitated the AD project to be prepared for making changing to hardware and/or software. 
To handle this uncertainty, the project develops multiple tracks that gives flexibility in the 
development process.  
 
The documentation trade-off: This an example from an agile team level. When a task to prepare 
documents explaining the codes, the team decided to find an alternate solution for the task 
assigned to the team. It was seen that agile empowered the teams to discuss the work and 
develop their own internal plans. The flexibility was a key aspect of agile methodology.  
 
Handling unknowns: Due to the rapid advancements in sensor system, it is important for the 
AD technology to freeze the sensor system as late as possible. In order to handle this 
uncertainty, the project uses an Operational Design Doman (ODD) that frames the operational 
conditions under which an automated feature is designed to function. When there is new 
functional needs, the ODD can be expanded to incorporate more advanced functions.  
 
Suppliers and components: Technologies such as Lidar, sensor, cameras, GPU, etc. are 
continuously improving in performance and cost. Also, suppliers of such technologies and 
services are often locked to a particular market or geography. Volvo needs to ensure that the 
AD project can handle emergent challenges pertaining to suppliers or technologies. This 
requires flexibility in the development process and an ability to handle changes in the supply 
network.  
 
Literature on agile development methods abundantly illustrate its advantages in terms of being 
conducive for fast changes, cross-functionality, improved collaboration etc. In a waterfall way 
of working, focus is on reducing uncertainty and curtails making changes to plans. This is seen 
as unfit for developing new technologies where tactics is considered highly essential in handling 
emergent challenges. From observations and insider experiences, the paper argues that agile 
way of working allows for tactical activities in a new technology development project. 
 
 23 
5.4. PAPER IV 
From a joint venture to an innovation ecosystem: Lessons from a longitudinal 
study of an autonomous car project 
 
Literature on ecosystem recognizes the lack of knowledge on the emergence of a new 
ecosystem as they are rarely studied in their emergent phase. Part of the challenge pertains to 
the rare occurrence of “new ecosystems” and the rather ex-post definition of ecosystems (Gawer 
et al., 2014; Jacobides et al., 2018). An ecosystem is described as a constellation of actors 
working together in creating value (Adner, 2006; Gomes et al., 2018; Jacobides et al., 2018; 
Moore, 1993), thereby rendering a shift from value chain perspective to value network (Peppard 
et al., 2006).  
 
Today, the notion of ecosystem is encompassed in more nuanced constructs such as hub 
ecosystem, innovation ecosystem, business ecosystem, open innovation ecosystem, etc. 
Literature on ecosystem attributes modular architecture as being vital to ecosystem 
attractiveness. However, achieving modularity is often seen as cumbersome process and largely 
dependent on the degree of control asserted by the keystone firm. In this context, it is important 
to develop new knowledge that explains how firms achieve modularity – accidental or 
intentional – in new technology development and the role of a keystone firm in using the 
modular technology to orchestrate the emergence of a new ecosystem. The purpose of Paper 
IV is to explore how an incumbent firm engages in collaborations to develop a new technology.  
To do so, the paper builds upon data from a longitudinal case study at Volvo’s AD technology 
development project. 
 
The resource and competence needs of the project pushed VCC to form a joint venture with 
Autoliv, a leader in automotive safety systems. The findings show that the joint venture 
(Zenuity) and the parent (Volvo) shared a “symbiotic” relationship. Zenuity intended to supply 
software for all OEMs which meant that it developed software compatible to all OEMs in the 
industry. Due to this set up, activities in the AD program were inherently aimed at establishing 
modularity. The symbiotic relationship between Zenuity and Volvo resulted in the development 
of a modular technology platform. Thus, the software development for AD technology through 
a joint venture, beyond the direct advantages of augmenting resources and competence, 
implicitly nurtured the formation of an innovation ecosystem.  
 
Paper IV argues that the AD program achieved modularity due to the unique nature of its joint 
venture partnership. Further, the findings show how Volvo transitioned from a parent firm of a 
joint venture to a keystone firm in an emerging ecosystem.  
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5.5. LINKING THE PAPERS TO THE OVERALL PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH  
The four papers appended to this licentiate thesis are all based on the longitudinal case study 
at Volvo’s AD program but are investigating different perspectives of the “technology 
development” program. Table 3 shows the relation between the papers and the research 
questions.  
 
Table 3. Mapping the research questions to the appended papers 
 
Paper I was drafted during the early phase of the study. During this phase, I focused on 
understanding the AD program. The findings (Paper I) highlight the network form of 
collaboration between Volvo and other actors. It also highlights the shortcomings of Volvo’s 
waterfall way of working and argues for the need to change this development approach to better 
engage with other actors in the network. This paper sets the foundation for my focus on value 
networks and exploring the ecosystem dimension of the AD program.  
 
Paper II and III discuss the AD program’s shift from waterfall to agile way of working. These 
findings offer important insights on the changes in the way of working in the AD program. 
Paper II discusses the agile transformation at Volvo’s AD program. In particular, Paper II 
highlights the challenges faced by a firm when changing its established ways of working and 
the paradoxes involved with institutionalizing agile development method in a large firm. 
Volvo’s waterfall way of working created challenges with collaborating with other actors, 
especially software firms, such as Zenuity. The agile transformation was an important aspect 
of Volvo’s efforts to improve the development work in the AD program and better synchronize 
development activities with its partner firms.  
 
Paper III also shows the importance of establishing efficient ways of working to share resources 
and competences with other actors. This paper provides insights on the importance of tactics in 
R&D projects and agile as an appropriate way of working to facilitate tactical activities in a 
project. Again, although being on a project level, this paper contributes to the understanding of 
Volvo’s transformation as a keystone firm. Literature on ecosystem highlight flexibility and 
awareness to the external environment as an important role of the keystone firm. Thus, agile 
facilitating tactical activities enhances Volvo’s ability to adapt towards new challenges and 
opportunities in the ecosystem. Although both Paper II & III discuss Volvo’s agile 
transformation, the findings are highly relevant to understand the collaborations in the 
ecosystem where most of the activities are centred around developing software features with 
many of the partner firms using the agile development method as their modus operandi.  
 
Paper IV explains the various collaborations in the AD program with particular focus on the 
joint venture established by Volvo and Zenuity. The paper addresses the emergence of new 
ecosystem by focusing on the “symbiotic” relationship between Volvo and Zenuity. This was 
identified as a reason for the development of a modular technology platform, often cited as a 
Research Questions Paper 
I 
Paper 
II 
Paper 
III 
Paper 
IV 
1) How does a new ecosystem emerge?  
S 
  
 
 
S 
2) How does a keystone firm orchestrate collaborations 
in an emerging ecosystem 
 
 
 
 
S 
 
S 
 
S 
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cornerstone of ecosystem emergence. The paper shows the increase in the number of 
collaborations and attributes it to Volvo’s ability to embed modularity in its technology 
development. Most firms struggle to establish an ecosystem due to the difficult in achieving a 
modular technology platform. Developing modularity involves reduced development speed and 
increased cost. However, the existence of a JV with the responsibility to develop software and 
the JV’s vision of supplying AD software to all OEMs implicitly resulted in a modular 
technology platform. Thus, paper IV shows the emergence of Volvo’s AD ecosystem by tracing 
the origins of several collaborations in the AD program. An overview of the study is depicted 
in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Overview of the study 
 
6. DISCUSSION  
The following sections discuss the findings of the longitudinal study in relation to the research 
questions and links them to the respective papers appended in the thesis. The final section 
revisits the research questions and provides a summary of the findings.  
6.1. DEVELOPING A NEW TECHNOLOGY IN A VALUE NETWORK 
Historically, the automotive industry has been a text book example of a value chain consisting 
of suppliers, distributors, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and retailers. The advent 
of AD technology has altered the competitive landscape of the automotive industry. In the early 
phase of the longitudinal study, it was noticeable that the project had multiple partners from 
outside the automotive industry. AD technology is heavily dependent on software development 
and sensor fusion which necessitates that Volvo collaborates with non-automotive firms. These 
firms possess knowledge that the OEM’s (Volvo) traditional value chain lacks.  
 
The AD program consists of multiple actors who operate in a non-sequential manner where 
value is created independently of each other but aimed at enhancing the technology platform 
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(Paper I & IV). For example, Uber develops its AD features independent of Volvo’s AD cars 
but shares the AD car platform with Volvo. This facilitates both Volvo and Uber to share the 
resources and competences to build the technology platform yet does not restrict them to pursue 
their independent business objectives. Similarly, Zenuity is allowed to commercialize its 
software solutions to other OEMs. This is in contrast to a value chain where development work 
proceeds in a sequential manner from raw materials, followed by manufacturing, and then 
distributing the finished goods to the end customers. The AD program thus departs from the 
value chain mode of operations that is usually the norm in the automotive industry (see figure 
4). Instead, it is a collaborative innovation project where value is created in a network with all 
actors playing a vital role in creating and delivering value (Peppard et al., 2006). However, this 
set-up was a significant challenge for Volvo as it is attuned to value chain mode of operations.  
 
Further, Paper I highlights the need to change the traditional waterfall way of working in order 
to handle the software development activities that is becoming a major part of development 
activities in the automotive industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. A typical value network. Adapted from Moore (1993) and (Alizadeh et al., 2017) 
6.2. AGILE TRANSFORMATION  
Early on, Volvo’s waterfall development method created bottlenecks in the project as most 
actors, including Zenuity, operated with agile development methodology (paper I, IV). The 
plan-driven waterfall way of working is tailor made for an industry steeped in the sequential 
value chain (Norman & Ramirez, 1993). However, with the increase in digital features, the need 
to develop software necessitated a change in the entire way of working. Initially, the AD 
program faced challenges due to the difficulty in adapting to value network and the waterfall 
way of working compounded the challenges in interactions between the actors (paper I). In 
order to synchronize activities in the emerging AD ecosystem, Volvo’s AD program adopted 
an agile way of working. This was an important milestone in Volvo’s path to becoming a 
keystone firm. By adapting to agile, which is acknowledged to promote flexibility, Volvo could 
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better address the challenges and opportunities in the ecosystem. It also helped Volvo 
synchronize activities with various actors in the ecosystem.  
 
The findings in Paper I discusses the challenges that Volvo faced in developing AD technology 
due to its plan-driven waterfall way of working. Based on the empirical data, Paper I argues 
that Volvo needs to revisit its way of working in order to adapt to changing competitive 
landscape in the industry (i.e., shift in competition from hardware products or features to digital 
features or services). Paper I also highlights how Volvo’s AD technology development project 
was constructed in a value network fashion. In 2018, as evinced in Paper I, Volvo made a shift 
from waterfall to agile development method. In seeking closer interaction with all actors, the 
AD program perceived agile development methodology as a better way of working in a value 
network. This further strengthened the claims made in Paper I about the need to shift the way 
of working to engage in value networks.  
 
Given the advantages of agile development methods (e.g., Scrum, Kanban, Extreme 
Programming (XP), Feature Driven Development (FDD), Lean etc.) in developing digital 
technology, the transformation from waterfall to agile (especially in a large organization) is not 
without challenges. The transition from a plan-driven waterfall way of working to agile 
development in the AD program entailed significant challenges. Initially, employees perceived 
the shift to agile as difficult and challenging (Paper II).  However, they also understood the 
importance of the transition and its impact on the future of the AD program. The agile 
transformation greatly improved the sharing of knowledge and resources between the various 
actors in the AD program (Paper III). Thus, paper II highlights how formal leaders can address 
the institutionalization of agile and contributes to literature on agile development by underlying 
the conflicts that arise during a transition from plan-driven way of working to agile.  
 
Further, Paper III elucidates the usefulness of agile development approach in the projects ability 
to be tactical in the day-to-day activities. Literature on project management has adequately 
addressed the importance of both strategy and tactics for project success (Hadar et al., 2008; 
Pinto et al., 1990; Slevin et al., 1987). Applying this theoretical framework, in Paper III, we 
identify that the previously used waterfall way of working in the AD program significantly 
restricted tactical activities. Thus, by addressing the importance of tactical activities in the AD 
program, Paper III sheds light on the usefulness of Agile way of working beyond the attributes 
highlighted in mainstream literature on Agile. Through various observational data and “insider-
outsider” approach (Asselin, 2003), Paper III argues that the agile way of working facilitates 
tactical activities in a project.  
6.3. MODULARITY AND ECOSYSTEM 
The AD program began as an internal innovation project. The complexity of the project pushed 
Volvo to set up a joint venture with Autoliv. The JV was set up to develop the entire software 
system for the AD technology. To this effect, both parent firms transferred resources (such as 
intellectual property, personnel etc.) to the JV. Additionally, commercializing the AD software 
to all OEMs was also attributed as one of the reasons for setting up the JV. Thus, Zenuity (the 
JV) was allowed to develop products independent of Volvo’s interference and functioned as an 
independent software supplier for AD vehicles. Paper IV identifies this as a key step in the 
emergence of the ecosystem. 
 
Literature on ecosystems highlights the lack of empirical studies on the emergence of a new 
ecosystem (Gawer et al., 2014; Jacobides et al., 2018). This is primarily due to the fact that 
ecosystems in general have an ex-post definition and tracing the emergence of an ecosystem 
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needs a long term perspective. The longitudinal study at Volvo led to findings that add 
significant contribution to literature on the emergence of an innovation ecosystem. In Paper I, 
it is established that Volvo’s AD program is embedded in a value network where all actors 
participate in the value creation activities in a non-linear fashion. In Paper IV, the findings from 
the longitudinal study explains how the ecosystem around Volvo’s AD program emerged. 
Through interviews, observational data (participant as observer), planning workshops and 
stakeholder interactions, Paper IV identifies the role of a ‘symbiotic’ JV in the emergence of 
an ecosystem.  
 
The JV, with its ambition to be a supplier of AD software for all OEMs, had to ensure that its 
features were compatible to all potential customer. Due to the dependence of the AD program 
on Zenuity’s AD software, Volvo implicitly developed a modular system that interfaces with 
Zenuity’s software. Developing modular systems are difficult in the early stage of a new 
technology due to the uncertain market potential of the technology. Further, focusing on 
modularity may increase the cost and slow down the pace of development. Although frustrating 
to develop, literature on ecosystem identifies modularity is an important element of an 
ecosystem as it facilitates in integrating complementary innovations and services onto a 
technology platform (Gawer et al., 2002; Gawer et al., 2007; Iansiti et al., 2004; Jacobides et 
al., 2018). With modularity being an unintended consequence of setting up the JV, Volvo was 
able to attract more partners to its AD program. Over time, the number of partner firms in the 
AD program increased significantly (see figure 5). Thus, Paper IV makes important 
contribution to the knowledge on the emergence of new ecosystem addressing the gap in the 
ecosystem literature (Jacobides et al., 2018). By owning the technology platform and 
externalizing software development, Volvo could orchestrate the activities in the AD program 
and position itself as a keystone actor.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. illustration of the emerging AD ecosystem (Source: author) 
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6.4. VOLVO AS THE KEYSTONE FIRM OF THE ECOSYSTEM   
One of the biggest challenges that Volvo faced was pertaining to its plan-driven waterfall way 
of working that was unsuitable for new technology development project with high complexity 
and uncertainty. This also hindered Volvo’s ability to coordinate activities with other actors 
(especially Zenuity). Also, AD technology is a complex system that consist of several digital 
technologies that needs to be integrated and processed by algorithms. This typically involves 
machine learning, activities that demand flexibility and adaptability. Volvo’s waterfall way of 
working was unsuitable to carry out such development activities. The agile transformation 
significantly improved Volvo’s ability to coordinate and cooperate with other actors in the 
emerging ecosystem (Iansiti et al., 2004; Jacobides et al., 2018). This, coupled together with 
Volvo’s ownership of the base car platform and Zenuity’s software, positioned Volvo as a 
keystone actor in the ecosystem. 
 
Literature on ecosystems highlights the importance of the keystone firm (Adner et al., 2016; 
Iansiti et al., 2004; Jacobides et al., 2018), that maintains the balance in an ecosystem and 
coordinates activities between the actors. The longitudinal case study argues that Volvo’s 
‘symbiotic’ joint venture facilitated the emergence of the AD ecosystem with Volvo as the 
keystone actor (paper IV). Although other actors like Uber, Baidu, Nvidia etc. had significant 
know-how and competences, Volvo was the facilitator of the partnerships and owned the base 
car (i.e., car platform) used for developing the AD technology. Volvo, as an OEM has the 
manufacturing, supply networks and infrastructure needed to integrate the AD technology into 
cars. The AD technology needs to be integrated with a product (i.e., car) for the end customer 
to perceive value. And, all actors in the network play important roles in the value that Volvo 
intends to provide its end customer (Dattée et al., 2018). Thus, Volvo has to rely on all the 
participants in the ecosystem and ensure that all actors could coordinate activities with one 
another (Iansiti et al., 2004). This positioned Volvo as a central actor that organizes activities 
and connects network participants (Iansiti et al., 2004). Also, Volvo actively engaged with 
government agencies across the world (e.g., NHTSA in the U.S.; Transportstyrelsen and 
Trafikverket in Sweden) in order to facilitate the commercialization of AD technology (Paper 
IV). By holding key assets, supply networks and manufacturing capabilities, Volvo could play 
the role of an orchestrator in the ecosystem. All these attributes greatly helped Volvo position 
itself as the keystone actor in the emerging AD ecosystem (Paper IV).  
 
Despite owning the core technology platform, Volvo did not hesitate to share value with other 
actors, identified by Iansiti et al. (2004) as an important character of a keystone firm. For 
instance, Uber pursues its own business interest in the area of ride sharing services and develop 
new offerings to suit its business needs (paper IV). Zenuity, on the other hand, develops its 
ADAS and AD software using Volvo’s car platform. However, Volvo does not restrict 
Zenuity’s ability to commercialize its software solution. This allows Zenuity to commercialize 
its AD solutions to all OEMs, despite Volvo being its parent firm and a key competitor to other 
OEMs (paper IV). Further, collaborations with technology firms like Nvidia allows Volvo to 
access critical knowledge and competences in the area of semiconductor technology.  Firms 
such as Tesla, for example, develop their own propriety chipsets leading to closed technology 
platform (www.tesla.com/autopilot). Other actors such as Luminar, Ericsson etc., develop 
technologies or solutions that improves Volvo’s AD technology. In line with literature on 
keystone firm (Iansiti et al., 2004), by allowing others to develop services, tools, or 
technologies, Volvo shows that it is willing to both create and share value with other actors.  
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Thus, the keystone firm is the de facto coordinator of activities in an ecosystem (Iansiti et al., 
2004) and the shift from waterfall to agile way of working greatly improved openness and 
flexibility in the ecosystem (Paper III & IV). In an adaptive ecosystem (Furr et al., 2018), the 
keystone firm needs to be flexible as it is difficult to predict the resource and competence 
requirements (Furr et al., 2018). The keystone firms also needs to be wary of new trends and 
opportunities that may arise in the external environment. Thus, being tactical is of utmost 
importance in an adaptive ecosystem and the agile way of working greatly enhances the AD 
program’s ability to adjust according to emergent needs (Paper III). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Volvo's transformation as the keystone firm of the ecosystem 
6.5. THE EMERGENCE OF INNOVATION ECOSYSTEMS  
The literature posits that all ecosystems consist of at least one keystone firm that coordinates 
the activities in the ecosystem. Further, modular platforms are quintessential for an ecosystem 
as they allow multiple actors to develop complementarities and integrate their value offerings 
with those of the platform. However, two questions pertaining to ecosystems remain 
inadequately studied. First, the factors that attribute to the emergence of an ecosystem. Second, 
how does a firm (incumbent automotive firm in this study), position itself as a keystone actor 
in a new ecosystem. These two important questions are addressed through this longitudinal 
study of Volvo’s AD program. 
 
How does a new ecosystem emerge? 
Literature identifies that new technologies are often faced with unclear standards and lack of 
complementary assets (Adner et al., 2010; Gawer et al., 2007; Tripsas, 1997, 2009). This is a 
major challenge in commercializing new technologies. Standardization of a new technology is 
important to usher the development of complementary assets, infrastructure and government 
policies. Such challenges, pertaining to developing and commercializing new technology, are 
usually overcome by a network of actors working together in a manner akin to a biological 
ecosystem (Moore, 1993).  
 
In management literature on ecosystems, modular platforms are identified as the cornerstone of 
an ecosystem (Scholten & Scholten, 2012).  However, firms are often unwilling to embrace 
modularity in the early stage of a new technology development. This is because, developing 
modular technologies can be time consuming and expensive.  Modularity often takes a back 
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seat and is often considered an irrational objective during the early stages of technology 
development, especially when market potential and customer demand for the new technology 
is unclear. Instead, modular technologies usually emerge during the late-cycle of a new 
technology when the management attention shifts to outsourcing, achieving economies of scale 
and reducing development costs.  
 
However, from an ecosystem perspective, modularity forms the core of the ecosystem. In the 
longitudinal case study, it was evident that the formation of a JV to develop software implicitly 
resulted in the modularity of Volvo’s AD technology. This can be seen as an important 
advantage of the AD program and resulted in the increase in new collaborations. The results 
contribute to literature on ecosystems by addressing how modular platforms can be developed 
and the role of a keystone actor in orchestrating the emergence of an ecosystem. By showing 
these factors that contribute to the emergence of an ecosystem, the case study addresses the 
question on how ecosystems emerge. 
 
How does a keystone firm orchestrate collaborations in an emerging ecosystem? 
The second contribution of this longitudinal case study is the illustration of the shift in Volvo’s 
role from being an OEM in a traditional value chain to a keystone actor in an emerging 
ecosystem. Literature on ecosystems shows that the keystone firm enjoys several advantages, 
however, not all firms are capable of becoming one.  
 
Findings from the longitudinal case study illustrated the efforts taken by the incumbent firm 
(Volvo) to become a keystone actor. Along with the development of a modular technology, a 
change in the way of working significantly improved the incumbent firm’s ability to coordinate 
activities in the ecosystem. Literature on ecosystem highlights the role of a keystone firm in 
coordinating the activities and sharing of resources. In this emerging ecosystem, the complexity 
of the technology, the unclear market demand and the uncertainty in legislation necessitated 
that the entire ecosystem was flexible in adapting to change. In this scenario, implementing 
agile as a development method significantly improved the incumbent firm’s ability to organize 
activities in the ecosystem. Agile, as a way of working that exemplifies flexibility and 
adaptability to changes in the environment, facilitated the incumbent firm to better coordinate 
activities in the AD program. With a modular technology and flexibility in the organizing 
activities, the incumbent firm was able to orchestrate the emergence of a new innovation 
ecosystem and positioned itself as the keystone firm.  
7. CONCLUSIONS  
This licentiate thesis set out to understand the emergence of an ecosystem and how an 
incumbent firm can position itself as a keystone actor in the ecosystem Through a longitudinal 
study, this thesis shows how the case firm (incumbent in the automotive industry) leveraged on 
its JV to establish a modular technology and attracted other firms to collaborate in the 
technology development. The ownership of a modular technology facilitated the keystone to 
enable other actors to develop complementarities. This, according to literature, enhances a new 
technology’s potential to become a dominant design. The development of a modular technology 
through a JV, and the establishment of multiple collaborations to develop features and services 
for the technology platform, led to emergence of a new innovation ecosystem and positioned 
the case firm as the keystone firm. 
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8. FUTURE STEPS 
The ecosystem studied as part of this licentiate thesis is a closed system where the primary goal 
is “value creation” (i.e., innovation ecosystem). Innovation ecosystems are closed networks 
where transactions occur amongst actors that participate in creating value (Jacobides et al., 
2018). As the ecosystem develops, new challenges arise related to appropriating this value. To 
move from “value creation” towards “value capture”, all actors must collaborate and persevere 
for common standards for the technology (Brem et al., 2016).  In  literature, the value creation 
ecosystem is addressed as an innovation ecosystem (Adner et al., 2016; Gomes et al., 2018; Oh 
et al., 2016) and the value capture ecosystem as a business ecosystem (Adner, 2017; Moore, 
1993). In an innovation ecosystem, the primary objective is to develop value in the form of a 
product or service. In a business ecosystem, actors are motivated by commercial prospect of 
the new product or service.  
 
 
 
Figure 7 From value creation to value capture  
 
This process of moving forward from an “innovation ecosystem” towards a “business 
ecosystem” necessitates a platform where all actors, from industry incumbents, to start-ups, to 
universities, can work together with the common goal of establishing standards for a new 
technology (see figure 7) (Gawer et al., 2014; Rohrbeck et al., 2009; Williamson et al., 2012).  
 
The plan for the second part of my PhD research is to better understand how an innovation 
ecosystem matures into a business ecosystem and the role of the keystone actor in facilitating 
this transformation, as outlined in Figure 8.  
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